Africa’s mining: in great shape or dire straits?
The current crisis points to the need to shore up while staying focused on the longer term opportunities
Africa’s mining executives can be forgiven a phlegmatic reaction to the shockwaves and potential future fallout of the war in the Middle East. Mining businesses on the continent have a long history of navigating severe tests, including governments forcing closures, regulatory interference, power blackouts and droughts. Although ordinary African people have suffered the consequences, the companies themselves have often emerged stronger.
Nevertheless, the aggregated impact of the war in the Middle East on Africa’s mining industries is one of significant risk exposure, especially for the Central African Copperbelt encompassing Zambia and the DRC’s copper and cobalt mines.
The TAZAMA (Tanzania Zambia Mafuta) pipeline is the conduit for most of the DRC’s petroleum product imports, and the 1,700km link from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to Ndola is the key energy pipeline to Zambia’s Copperbelt – and vital for the country’s broader economic strategy, with plans to significantly upgrade capacity by 2030.
But with the Strait of Hormuz closed, Middle East shipments to Dar es Salaam have become a trickle. The Brent crude oil price surged 66% in March, and is currently 56% higher than before the war. Hopes that prices and volatility would settle have been dashed by the cessation of the mid-April peace talks; instead, there is a protracted standoff with no end in sight. Even once tanker shipments do restart, energy supplies will remain tight for many months thereafter, because the production and supply chain has been ruptured. Thirty-nine oilfields or refineries, across nine countries, were damaged in the first month of the war alone. And free, unfettered navigation as it existed pre-war may never resume.
Apart from the operating cost impact of, in particular, diesel’s price escalation, another concern for Africa’s mining supply chains is the supply of sulphuric acid, vital as a reagent to leach copper and cobalt from oxide ores. Elemental sulphur is a major hydrocarbon refining byproduct of the Middle East’s oil industry, and the Strait of Hormuz is the gateway for 48% of the commodity’s global trade. The Central African Copperbelt, however, sources 90% of its sulphur imports from there, transported by vessel from ports now blocked by Iran or, at the time of writing, blockaded by the U.S.
On Zambian mines, although leaching is growing in importance as a secondary, lower-capex means of increasing production, most copper is extracted from deeper-lying sulphide ores processed through smelting. But in the DRC as much as 70% of production is sourced from oxide ores.
As such, the apparently symbiotic relationship between the Persian Gulf oil industry and sub-Saharan Africa’s mining sector has been revealed as a fragile interdependency, notes mining analyst Nicolaas Steenkamp. Refinery shutdowns have pushed sulphur prices up dramatically: in mid-April the per-tonne price was up 75% from the start of 2026. High-volume alternative sulphur supply sources are not readily available: Oman exports infrequent, small quantities, while output from refineries in Canada, America’s Gulf Coast region, and Eastern Europe’s Black Sea region traditionally goes to non-African mining geographies or the fertiliser industry. Compounding the issue is that the world’s largest sulphuric acid producer, China, will ban exports from 1 May. This is translating to further price pressures. One report notes that at the commodity’s key East African transport node, Dar es Salaam, mid-April offers are hitting $1,000 per tonne.
In this context, Africa’s mining giants are taking measures not only to secure and stockpile supplies, but to reduce reliance on shipments. Sulphuric acid is itself a byproduct of the copper smelting process, and plans have been rolled out to capture greater volumes of acid. Examples are FQM’s recent Kansanshi S3 expansion, which specifically includes major smelter upgrades, and Ivanhoe’s Kamoa-Kakula mine in the DRC. The latter recently announced that operations now include the production and sale of sulphuric acid, transforming a supply chain disruption into a strategic advantage.
Importantly, too, the Zambian government’s recent introduction of sulphuric acid export permits will help manage the critical domestic supply. This commendable proactivity should be matched by further strategic thinking and the acceleration of other longstanding plans.
Diversification is key
Zambia spends $2.55 billion on fuel imports annually. Energy cost increases attributable to the war will cascade throughout the mining sector and the overall economy. The Middle East crisis must catalyse the Zambian government to hedge the nation’s energy bets.
Fast-tracking energy diversification through investments in renewables should be a priority, as should the completion of the Ndola refinery, announced last year as a $1.1 billion partnership with the China Zambia Petrochemical Corporation (CZPC), planned to process 60,000 barrels per day.
A 30- to 40-year vision for alternative sources and import transport corridors should also strategise bilateral cooperation and development agreements with neighbouring countries. Namibia is a hotspot for oil and gas exploration, with the country positioned to become an onshore and offshore oil exporter by the end of the decade. Zambia should be in concept phase discussions not only to secure a joint-venture pipeline to the Ndola refinery, but also, possibly, to build a refinery, allowing the export of finished products.
Another of Zambia’s southern African neighbours already ranks 24th globally for in-production oil and gas extraction sites. Including new fields which will soon be on stream, Angola’s Petroleum Derivatives Regulatory Institute (IRDP) director-general projects over 400,000 barrels of daily production, a figure confirmed by the U.S. International Energy Administration. At the December 2025 Africa Energy Week, he highlighted upstream investment opportunities. He could not have known how, in the subsequent few months, global events would dramatically illuminate his pitch. Currently, the vast majority of Angola’s crude exports go to Asia Pacific; just 1% – to South Africa – stays on the continent. If TAZAMA can no longer be deemed adequate to guarantee the country’s energy security, surely, now, Zambia must be thinking of a pipeline from one of Angola’s refineries to its west?
Meanwhile, plans for a Zambian sovereign wealth fund were first announced more than a decade ago, and were revisited more recently – but the targeted 2025 launch was not met. President Hichilema’s government must balance the need to bolster central bank reserves so as to avoid debt defaults in the future, invest directly in infrastructure and industrial diversification, and ignite the longer-term, generational goal of shared wealth creation. But the current geopolitical shockwaves illustrate that the trade-offs between various mechanisms to stabilise, develop, and grow the economy are less important than acting to prioritise a visionary investment of mining royalties and remittances.
Silver lining opportunities
It’s clear that the Middle East war has created a severe geopolitical and economic jolt. Is African mining heading for a deep setback? Some mining industry leaders believe a prolonged Strait of Hormuz closure will slash the world’s economic growth prospects, reduce industrial demand for metals and minerals, and slow the renewables transition. According to this view, the combined effect on the global mining industry will be profound – including in Africa, and especially the copper sector.
Besides industrial demand and supply chains, the big picture also involves possible investor risk aversion. Mining companies will need to move fast to shore up capital and solidify balance sheets. Even doing this, however, may not mitigate a longer-term impact: the retardation of new copper mine development. Low investment levels now may cause supply problems long after the Middle East crisis is over.
But, for the moment, there is no current indication that mining markets are dampening. Cost-stack inflationary pressures are mounting, however: “diesel, logistics, insurance, reagents – [these] are all moving higher together,” notes Argus Metals’ Raghav Jain. In Zambia diesel is now 92% costlier than before the war, and Jain notes that some miners are now factoring in 5%-10% copper selling price increases. Other analysts foresee a higher, supply-driven 10-25% rise in cobalt and copper prices over the next 12 months.
Nonetheless, there are positives, too, for Africa’s mining industry. Gold is a safe haven in troubled times. And, while the conflict has highlighted the world’s ongoing, enormous reliance on fossil fuels, policymakers are certain to quicken implementation of the renewable energy transition. So, miners’ higher operating costs may be offset by commodity price gains, specifically for the continent’s gold, cobalt and copper producers.
As ever, nuances abound. Many mines in Africa do not operate at or near optimal operational efficiency, so now is the time to regear for improvement. And crisis is a catalyst for innovation. FQM’s Kansanshi mine has just deployed the world’s first ultra-large battery-electric mining truck, manufactured by Hitachi – evidence that efforts to improve energy efficiency and switch from fossil fuels are under way.
Mining has a long horizon for returns. But the worldwide demand for critical minerals and metals like cobalt and copper is guaranteed.
JVChantete will continue to support its clients however possible during this testing time for the industry.
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1Bank of Zambia, Direction of Trade Report: Q1-Q4 2024
2See p7, Table 3 of 2025 country report:
https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Angola/angola.pdf
3Ibid, see p10, Figure 8